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PROTECTIVE DISCOVERY ORDERS AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE LIMITS OF SEA TTLE TIMES AND
THE BUSINESS WEEK DECISION
I. INTRODUCTION

There is a rising trend among corporate litigants to seek broad protective
orders preventing disclosure of materials produced in discovery.' The response
is a mounting criticism that the liberal granting of protective orders, sealing such
pre-trial records, represents an unacceptable encroachment upon First
Amendment principles and the right to an open judicial system.2 Restrictions on
public access to judicial proceedings routinely trigger a First Amendment
inquiry.3 In the realm of protective discovery orders, however, courts must

'See Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 788-89 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting
increasing use of confidentiality orders within "current trend ofjudicial secrecy"); Poliquin
v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 535 (1st Cir. 1993) (commenting on the liberal use of
protective orders on both pre-trial and post trial materials); Howes v. Ashland Oil Inc., No.
87-5939, 1991 WL 73251, at *3 (6th Cir. May 6, 1991) (acknowledging protective order
prompted defendant to engage in a "nuclear war of discovery").
2 See, e.g., Sandor M. Polster, Media'sRight To Report is in Danger, Bangor Daily
News, Dec. 9, 1995 (warning against corporate secrecy through the use of protective
orders); OfPriorRestraint, Indianapolis Star, Dec. 8, 1995, at Al 6 (describing protective
orders as "judicial interference with the First Amendment"); Casual Gag Orders,
ConstitutionalFarce,N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 1995, § 1, at 18 (criticizing the imposition of
protective orders in litigation).
- The First Amendment states in pertinent part, "Congress shall make no law...
U.S. Const. amend I; see Seattle
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press ....
Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 37, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2209-10 (1984) (concluding
protective orders can survive First Amendment scrutiny); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 575, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2826 (1980) (establishing a qualified First
Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings); In re Orion Pictures, 21 F.3d 24, 26
(2d Cir. 1994) (recognizing public access to the judicial system is based within the First
Amendment); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1986) (acknowledging
First Amendment is implicated in reviewing third party access to discovery materials);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1986) (reviewing protective
orders does not involve a First Amendment analysis), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043, 107 S.
Ct. 907 (1987); United States v. Anderson, 799 F.2d 1438, 1441 (11 th Cir. 1986) (stating
the First Amendment does not guarantee the public a right to view discovery documents);
First Amendment Coalition v. Judicial Inquiry and Review Bd., 784 F.2d 467, 471-79 (3d
Cir. 1986) (applying First Amendment scrutiny to restrictions on a judicial disciplinary
board); Publicker Indus. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1067-71(3d Cir. 1984) (emphasizing
importance of public access to hearings and transcripts in civil proceeding); Worrel
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consider the privacy rights of litigants and realize that litigation between
commercial entities may involve issues sensitive
to public disclosure, such as
4
secrets.
industrial
or
data,
financial
detailed
A recent, widely publicized example of the conflict between efficient
discovery and judicial restraint arose in Procter& Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust
Co.' In a decision evoking a media outcry, a district court judge refused to lift
an injunction preventing the magazine Business Week from publishing

documents filed with the court as part of a motion.6 The documents, shielded by
a protective order, again raise the specter of First Amendment protection and
access to the judicial forum.7 On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
responded to the concern by labeling the injunction a prior restraint." The
opinion by the appellate court affords Business Week the heightened protections
granted under the First Amendment, despite the finding of the trial judge that the
magazine violated a court order when it obtained documents filed with the court

Newspapers of Indiana, Inc. v. Westhafer, 739 F.2d 1219, 1224 (7th Cir. 1984) (holding
broad statute restricting information on indictments violates First Amendment); United
States v. Three Juveniles, 862 F. Supp. 651, 654 (D. Mass. 1994) (noting that statute
governing juvenile records requires a constitutional examination). But see NBC v. Presser,
828 F.2d 340, 352 (6th Cir. 1987) (Ryan, J., dissenting) (noting public access to court
records stems from common law, not the First Amendment).
" See Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 300 (D. Del. 1985)
(concluding that defendants must reval secret formula for Coke during discovery); see also
Note, Trade Secrets in Discovery:From FirstAmendment Disclosure to Fifth Amendment
Protection, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1330, 1337 (1991) (equating trade secrets as a form of

property entitled to protection under the fifth amendment).
S 78 F.3d 219 (6th Cir. 1996).

Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 193 (S.D. Ohio.
1995) [hereinafter Bankers Trust].
" See sources cited supra note 2; see also Saundra Tony, Business Week Case Leaves
Unresolved Issues, Wash. Post, Oct. 30, 1995, at F7; Claudia Maclachlan, Did Business
WeekFold Too Easily?, NAT'L L. J., Oct. 23, 1995, at Al; Chilling Impact, Business Week'
Wins and Loses in Court, Columbus Dispatch, Oct. 10, 1995, at 8A; Judges as Editors;
PriorRestraint Decision Must Be Overturned, Ashbury Park Press, Oct. 6, 1995, Sec. A,
at 14.
8 Procter & Gamble, 78 F.3d 219 at 225. Under common law, the term "prior
restraint" refers to "a system of unreviewable administrative censorship or licensing...
[Tihe Supreme Court has extended the meaning of prior restraint to include judicial orders
having an impact analogous to administrative censorship." In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 183
(U.S. App. D.C. 1979).
In a harsh criticism of the lower court's opinion, the Sixth Circuit in Procter &
Gamble stated: "[A]t no time... did the District Court appear to realize that it was
engaging in a practice that, under all but the most exceptional circumstances, violates the
Constitution." 78 F.3d at 225.
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under seal of a protective order.9
This article will examine the Business Week case within the broad concerns
surrounding protective orders. It will illustrate the differing approaches federal
courts have taken when applying First Amendment analysis to the issuance of
protective orders in civil actions, particularly when such orders ensnare

non-litigant third parties.' 0 Further, it will highlight the range of issues that arise
when considering the plight of Business Week and how, in light of the scant
authority by the Supreme Court, a blinkered approach has provided anomalous
results among the circuits. "
II. THE BUSINESS WEEK DECISION
In October 1994, Procter & Gamble filed suit in the United States District
Court against Bankers Trust alleging fraud and securities violations in a
derivatives contract between the two companies.' 2 At the outset of the litigation,
the District Court issued a protective order shielding all confidential materials

produced in discovery. 3 On September 1, 1995, Procter & Gamble moved to

9 Procter& Gamble, 78 F.3d 219 at 225. In rejecting the tactics employed by the
District Court in determining how and under what circumstances Business Week obtained
the documents, the court stressed that "[w]hile these might be appropriate lines of inquiry
for a contempt proceeding, they are not appropriate bases for issuing a prior restraint." Id.
'oCompareAnderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (incorporating
the First Amendment within the realm of protective orders) with Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1986) (concluding protective orders fall outside the
purview of the First Amendment), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987).
" Compare In re Halkin, 598 F.2d 176, 183 (U. S. App. D.C. 1979) (applying similar
standard to protective orders as to prior restraint) with In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig.,
820 F.2d. 352, 355 (11 th Cir. 1987) (holding protective orders issued upon a showing of
good cause are not subject to heightened scrutiny) and Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785
F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir. 1986) (concluding that courts need not concern themselves with
the First Amendment when issuing protective orders), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1043, 107 S.
Ct. 907 (1987) andinre San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 115 (1st Cir. 1981) (recognizing
that "[t]he products of discovery ... embody significant but somewhat limited First
Amendment interests").
'2 Bankers Trust, 900 F. Supp. at 187. Procter & Gamble's original claim included
allegations of fraud and misrepresentation as well as violations of the Commodities
Exchange Act. In re Bankers Trust Co., 61 F.3d 465,467 (6th Cir. 1995 It sought nearly
$200 million in damages. Id.
'" Bankers Trust, 900 F. Supp. at 187. In a subsequent opinion the Sixth Circuit
fiercely criticized the lower court's governing of the protective order for allowing the parties
to dictate what discovery it deemed confidential. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust
Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996).
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amend their complaint to include RICO 4 violations!'
Subsequently, an
associate lawyer working for Bankers Trust's counsel unaware of the protective
order delivered a copy of the supporting documents attached to the motion into
Business Week's hands.' 6 In response, the parties to the lawsuit quickly
obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order preventing Business Week from
publishing the court protected records.' 7
The publishers of Business Week, McGraw-Hill, immediately appealed the
injunction to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals."' Initially, however, the Sixth
Circuit avoided ruling on the constitutionality of the temporary restraining order
claiming it lacked jurisdiction to review the decision absent a final order. 9
McGraw-Hill then petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States." In a terse opinion, Justice Stevens remanded the case to the District
Court for final adjudication on the temporary restraining order, thus avoiding the
need to address the conflict between the First Amendment and broad protective
2
orders. '

Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Title IX, 18 U.S.C. § 1961.
's Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 193, 194 (S.D. Ohio
'

1995). The stipulated protective order was originally approved by Judge Rubin in January
1995, approximately two months after Procter & Gamble filed suit. Id. at 195. With the
death of Judge Rubin shortly thereafter, the case was reassigned to Judge Feikins. Bankers
Trust, 900 F. Supp. at 187.
Procter & Gamble's decision to amend its complaint was prompted by the wealth of
materials it received in discovery under the protective order. Procter& Gamble, 900 F.
Supp. at 194. In deliberating on the motion to amend, Judge Feikins noted that "plaintiff
received approximately 6500 tape recordings and 300,000 pages of other sensitive materials
from the defendants." Id.
"Bankers Trust, 900 F. Supp. at 190.
' Id. at 187. After learning that Business Week intended to publish the material that
evening, Judge Feikins granted a restraining order on September 13, 1995. Id. at 188.
IS See McGraw-Hill Companies v. Procter & Gamble Co., _ U.S.
_,116 S. Ct. 6, 6
(1995) (reviewing the procedural history of Business Week's appeals).
" Id.; see alsoClaudia Maclachlan, DidBusiness Week Fold Too Easily?, NAT'L L.
J., Oct. 23, 1995, at Al (discussing the tactics of Business Week in appealing the decision
of the lower court).
20 McGraw-Hill at _,116 S. Ct. at 6.
23 McGraw-Hill at _ 116 S.
Ct. at 7. Although noting the procedural failings in the
original injunction, Justice Stevens declined to address the merits of Business Week's
application to stay the restraining order. Id. In rejecting the propriety of the Supreme Court
to review Feikins order, the opinion admonishes Business Week for creating the impression
that it was unaware of the presence of the original protective order when it obtained the
materials in controversy. Id. Justice Stevens is clearly uncomfortable with the procedural,
as well as the constitutional, boundaries of his decision, but admits that "the manner in
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On remand, district court judge Feikins, unsealed the amended complaint
but refused to vacate the original injunction.2 2 Echoing Justice Steven's concern
over the method of procurement, Judge Feikins conducted a two day hearing to
determine if Business Week was aware of the protective order when it obtained
the Procter & Gamble filings.' Finding such awareness on the part of Business

Week, the decision counters the argument that to bar publication is a violation
of the First Amendment, by placing heavy reliance on the need for preserving
efficient24discovery and the refusal to let Business Week "snub its nose at court
orders."

In a succinct, if not unduly harsh, opinion the Sixth Circuit ultimately
reversed the injunction against Business Week, admonishing Judge Feikins for
ignoring the unconstitutionality of what it deemed a prior restraint upon the
press.' The appeals court concluded that the trial judge had failed to distinguish

between the rights of a party to disseminate those materials it receives in
discovery, and what it considered a gag order on a third party. 26 It also criticized
the district court for failing to manage what it considered to be a poorly executed
protective order.2 7
III. THE PROTECTIVE ORDER CONTROVERSY
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure emphasize the importance of

which [Business Week] came into possession of the information it seeks to publish may
have a bearing on its right to do so." Id. He acknowledges, however, that the District
Courts order appeared to be unsupported by the factual inquiries required by Rule 65(b) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id. at_, 116 S. Ct. at 6.
22 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 193 (S.D. Ohio
1995).
' Id. at 189-91. In his decision, United States District Judge Feikens is quick to

highlight the dubious nature of Business Week's journalistic inquiry into the original suit.
Id. at 188. Upholding the injunction he concluded that the original protective order
satisfied a "substantial governmental interest" in protecting the efficiency of the discovery
process. Id. at 193. The decision subsequently received heavy criticism for focussing on
the tactics employed by Business Week in obtaining the disputed materials rather than
addressing the validity of the original injunction. See Judges as Editors;PriorRestraint
Decision Must Be Overturned, Ashbury Park Press, Oct. 6, 1995, Sec. A, at 14
(commenting on the underlying issue of prior restraint).
2 Bankers Trust, 900 F. Supp. at 192-93.
2

Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996).
Id.

27

Id. at 227.

25
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timeliness and efficiency in the federal court system.2 Rule 1 liberally vests
courts with the power to interpret the rules in a manner that ensures the
administration of all civil actions in a prompt and productive manner.'
Prompted by these considerations, litigants routinely seek, and trial courts often
award, protective orders." These orders range from a specific limitation on
access to certain discovery materials to "blanket" or "umbrella" protective
orders which restrict the dissemination of all materials produced by the parties
before trial." The rationale is that by placing materials under a protective order
parties are less likely to withhold information from each other, thus reducing the
need for evidentiary hearings and burdensome judicial monitoring of the
discovery process. 32
The threshold for obtaining such a permit is low. 3 3 Rule 26(c) dictates that
a protective order is awarded upon a showing of "good cause" only.' The
inherent weakness within the rule is that many courts fird "good cause" simply
in the desire to foster an efficient court proceeding, ignoring the underlying
issues surrounding the balance between confidentiality and public access.35 The
argument thus becomes somewhat circular. Validity of a protective order
depends upon a showing of good cause. A showing of good cause is established
by the likely effect of the protective order, namely efficient discovery.
The most commonly used method of mounting a direct attack on protective

21 FED.

R. Civ. P. 1. Rule 1 states in pertinent part, "These rules ...shall be

construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of

every action." Id.
2

id.

o See cases cited supra note 1.
3'See Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 532 (1st Cir. 1993) (noting the

scope and structure of protective orders).
32 See In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d. 352, 357 (1lth Cir. 1987)
(emphasizing the desire to maximize the participation and efficiency of the discovery

process).
3'

FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). Rule 26(c) provides in pertinent part "Upon motion ...and

for good cause shown, the court... may make an order which justice requires to protect a
party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense
3

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c).

' See Poliquin,989 F.2d at 532 (emphasizing the deference awarded to trial judges
in fashioning broad protective orders); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108,
1123 (3d Cir. 1986) (advocating the usefulness of umbrella orders); see generallyMANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LMGAnTON § 21.432 (3rd ed. 1995) (stating, "an umbrella order will
expedite production, reduce costs, and avoid the burden on the court of

document-by-document adjudication").
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orders is the First Amendment. This weapon, however, is blunted somewhat by
the United States Supreme Court in the seminal case of Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart.m In Seattle Times, the Court declared that a protective order does
not warrant traditional strict scrutiny under the First Amendment if the order is
supported by a showing of good cause, limited to materials obtained only in
pre-trial discovery and does not prevent the dissemination of information
gleaned from other sources.3 7 The decision gathers several components of the

trial process together to distinguish the use of protective orders against the
traditionally imposing presence of First Amendment strict scrutiny.' The Court
considers the differences between public testimony versus private discovery
through depositions or interrogatories, as well as the right to disseminate
information under a protective order versus prior restraint on information
gathered elsewhere.39 In recognizing "[t]he unique position that such orders
occupy in relation to the First Amendment," the Court frames the "good cause"
balancing test within the language of intermediate scrutiny, granting protective
orders merely upon a showing of an important governmental interest. 40 One
example of such an important governmental interest is the need for a timely and

467 U.S. 20, 104 S. Ct. 2199 (1984).
37 Id. at 37, 104 S. Ct. at 2209-10. The Court granted certiori to resolve the conflict
between the circuits as to what standard of review was appropriate when considering First
Am=ment concerns within the civil discovery process. Compare In re Halkin, 598 F.2d
176, 191 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (classifying the issuance of protective orders as that of a prior
restraint implicating First Amendment considerations) with In re San Juan Star Co., 662
F.2d 108, 116 (1 st Cir. 1981) (recognizing only a "heightened sensitivity" to "limited" First

Amendment interests).
Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 30-36, 104 S. Ct. at 2206-09.
" Id.; see also Howes v. Ashland Oil, No. 87-5939, 1991 WL 73251, at *7 (6th Cir.
May 6, 1991) (noting privacy interests of litigants involved in discovery); Butterworth v.
Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 631-32, 110 S. Ct. 1376, 1381 (1990) (distinguishing the right to
divulge information obtained before, rather than during, a judicial proceeding).
38

40 Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2207 (1984). In
fashioning the test the Supreme Court states that a trial judge must consider if the "practice
in question" furthers "an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression" and whether "the limitation of First Amendment freedoms" is
"no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental
interest involved." Id. at 32 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413, 94 S. Ct.
1800, 1811 (1974)); see also Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030, 1052, 111
S. Ct. 2720, 2733 (1991) (distinguishing those situations in which traditional balancing
tests do not apply); Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1, 28, 106 S. Ct.
2735, 2751 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing reliance on compelling
governmental interest standard for question on access to criminal proceeding); Federal
Election Comm'n v. International Funding Inst., 969 F.2d 1110, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(subjecting ban on private use of contributor lists to intermediate scrutiny).
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efficient discovery process.4'
Since Seattle Times, debate has focused on whether the Court has
encouraged the growth of blanket protective orders by vesting too much
discretion in the trial court to conduct good cause reviews within a liberal
interpretation of Rule 26.42 The prevalence of protective orders has led to the
criticism that there is too little guidance on establishing the outer boundaries of
such orders.' Courts continue to disagree on how the First Amendment applies
to the issue of over broad protective orders with the increased number of
corporate litigants requesting confidentiality of discovery materials." The Third
Circuit ruled that the First Amendment has little relevance, if any, to the
analysis. 45 In contrast, the First Circuit is unwilling to reject the First

41 Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 34-36, 104 S. Ct. at 2208-09. The Court rejects the
additional burdens that would be imposed by the strict scrutiny of traditional First
Amendment investigation stating, "[t]he trial court is in the best position to weigh fairly the
competing needs and interests of the parties affected by discovery. The unique character
of the discovery process requires that the trial court have substantial latitude to fashion
protective orders." Id; see also In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d. 352, 356
(11th Cir. 1987) (emphasizing the procedural benefits produced by "umbrella" protective
orders).
4 Compare Arthur R-Miller, Confidentiality,Protective Orders,and Public Access

to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 471-73 (1991) (defending use of protective orders

against reforms aimed at opening up discovery process) with Patrick M. Livingston, Note,
Seattle Times v. Rhinehart: Making "Good Cause" a Good Standardfor Limits on
Disseminationof DiscoveredInformation, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV. 547, 558 (1986) (criticizing

Seattle Times for undermining First Amendment principles).
43

See Dianne L. Bratvold, Note, Protective Orders and the Use of Discovery
Materials Following Seattle Times, 71 MINN. L. REV. 171, 192 (1986) (advocating a

balancing of interests in the granting of protective orders).
4
See, e.g., The Courier-Journal v. Marshall, 828 F.2d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 1987)
(upholding defendant's association rights under First Amendment over media's right of
access to depositions); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1119 (3d Cir.
1986) (spporting the use of umbrella orders free from the imposition of First Amendment
analysis), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 976, 108 S. Ct. 487 (1987); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc.,
805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (advocating a retention of First Amendment considerations).
4S Cipollone, 785 F.2d at 1119. The Cipollone court identified the ambiguity in the
Supreme Court decision thus:
[I]t was unclear whether Seattle Times mandated a Rule 26(c) analysis
without regard to the First Amendment or whether it required an analysis
that included a least restrictive means test. This ambiguity may be
significant because the good cause analysis, although by no means toothless
... is significantly less stringent than the least restrictive means test.
Id. at 1118-19.
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Amendment's involvement entirely.' Prior to Seattle Times, the First Circuit
dictated that the good cause standard requires a heightened sensitivity to First
Amendment considerations.4 7 In its first post Seattle Times decision, the First
Circuit, in Anderson v. Cryovac ' appears to avoid a conflict by couching its pre
Seattle Times, "heightened sensitivity" within the rubric of the Supreme Court
decision.4 9 By structuring an analysis within the good cause framework,

however, the court fails to fully distinguish the situation in Seattle Times, in
which a party to the suit wished to disseminate information, with the issue
presented of a third party wishing to intervene and publish the discovered
materials.' In a subsequent First Circuit opinion the court suggests that
traditional First Amendment strict scrutiny is only brought to the fore when good

cause is absent from the granting of a protective order.5
Similarly, the argument is raised that the broad discretionary powers
conferred upon judges to grant protective orders has been unfairly expanded to
include those materials introduced at trial, filed in court under seal of a protective
order, or produced in discovery, but otherwise available as a public record. 2
Although Federal courts have generally raised the standard of review to a

' See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (rejecting Cipollone
by stressing that the First Amendment does retain a presence within protective orders); In
re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 1981) (noting "good cause" standard
must incorporate a "heightened sensitivity" to First Amendment).

"' In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d at 115.

805 F.2d 1 (lst Cir. 1986).
Id. at 7. The Anderson court states: "[w]e read the [Seattle Times] opinion as
applying the heightened scrutiny test of [Procunierv. Martinez] to the practice of
restraining a litigant's right to disseminate discovery information, not to any particular
application of Rule 26(c)." Id. at 7 n.2.
" Id. at 9; see also B. Deidre Brennan, Comment, Rule 26(c) Protective Orders:
FirstAmendment Scrutiny and the GoodCause Standard,21 SuFFOLK U. L.REV. 909, 915
(1987) (noting the distinction between those parties seeking disclosure).
"' Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc. 858 F.2d 775, 789 (1st Cir. 1988).
2 See Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 532-35 (1st Cir. 1993) (reviewing
post trial disclosure of various materials brought within control of protective order); In re
Perry, 859 F.2d 1043, 1049 (1st Cir. 1988) (criticizing extension of protective order within
administrative hearing to cover information distributed by employee's union). The court
in Perrynoted that, contrary to the administrative judge's opinion, a vague and broad
protective order written simply to prevent "abuse" of the proceeding reduced its capacity to
survive constitutional muster. In re Perry,859 F.2d at 1050; see also In re "Agent Orange"
Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d. 139, 148 (2d Cir. 1987) (declaring that absent good cause a
lifting of the protective order was provident); Bank of America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n.
v. Hotel Rittenhouse Assocs., 800 F.2d 339, 343 (3d Cir. 1986) (distinguishing unsealing
of court filed settlement agreement from facts in Seattle Times).
48

49
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showing of "compelling government interest" when restricting evidence
introduced into the trial record, they have not always extended such heightened
scrutiny to court filings produced under the umbrella of the original "good
cause" protective order.5 3
In general, unlike discovery materials, a settlement or motion filed with the
court is a public component of a civil trial.54 Such filings, as a public record, are
thus presumptively open for inspection." Seattle Times confirmed the belief,
however, that no such public right of access extends to those materials generated
by pre-tral discovery.ss The problem arises, therefore, when a court imposes a
restriction on the dissemination of material that is first produced under a
protective order but later introduced into evidence or attached to pre-trial
pleadings. 7 The district court in Procter & Gamble, declared that such
restrictions are within the bounds of the protective order, and as such, are
afforded review under the less stringent balancing test of "good cause."ss Other

courts, however, reject such a practice and favor a rule that any restriction on a
document filed with the court under a protective order is subject to a separate
and more deliberate review which must establish a compelling reason before
withholding the information. 9
Third parties, such as media outlets who are adversely affected by
protective orders, criticize courts for curtailing the right to disseminate under the
guise of maintaining an efficient court process.'
Although Seattle Times

Poliquin,989 F.2d at 534 (1st Cir. 1993) (retaining Rule 26 standard for other
complaints filed against defendant but produced in discovery under protective order).
3'See United States ex rel. Stinson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 944 F.2d 1149, 1158 (3d
Cir. 1991) (stressing, absent protective order, all material produced in discovery is
potentially accessible to public); In re Rafferty, 864 F.2d 151, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(emphasizing that protective order cannot be used retroactively to restrict information
gathered outside discovery). But see Poliquin, 989 F.2d at 534 (preventing post trial
dissemination of public records generated under protective order).
-- See Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597, 98 S.Ct. 1306,
1312 (1978) (acknowledging public accessibility of judicial records).
m Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1984).
5 See Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 534 (1st Cir. 1993) (holding court
filings introduced through discovery remained sealed under a protective order).
" Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 192 (S.D. Ohio
1995).
"' See Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1986) (criticizing trial
court's selective relaxation of protective orders upon third parties).
'0 See In re Perry, 859 F.2d 1043, 1048-49 (1st Cir. 1988) (criticizing extension of
protective order to cover information distributed by union of party employee); The
Courier-Journal v. Marshall, 828 F.2d 361, 367 (6th Cir. 1987) (denying newspapers right
-1
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recognizes that the right of litigants to publish information produced through
discovery is weaker than those parties who are otherwise subject to judicial
censorship through prior restraint, it is unclear whether this assumption extends

to the rights of non-parties seeking to pierce the order's veil of protection. 6' To
this end, the stifling effect of protective orders is often challenged when the
underlying action involves a matter of widespread public concern, such as those
cases involving products liability or health issues.62 For example, in a widely
publicized case involving the claims by Vietnam veterans against the
manufacturers of Agent Orange, the Second Circuit lifted a protective order
preventing disclosure of the materials generated during discovery.63 The court

stated that "[any inconvenience to which the appellants are subjected certainly
is outweighed by the enormous public interest in the Agent Orange litigation and

the compelling need for class members and non-class members alike to evaluate
fully the efficacy of settling this litigation."
As noted above, Seattle Times concerned the right of a defendant to
disseminate materials it received during discovery.6' The court did not directly
consider a restriction on a third party wishing to gain information filed with the

to gain access to fiuits of discovery). The court in Perry noted that, contrary to the
adminisrative judge's opinion, a vague and broad protective order written simply to prevent
"abuse" of the proceeding, reduced its capacity to survive constitutional muster. Perry, 859
F.2d at 1050.
" Compare Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 788 (3d Cir. 1994)
(noting court must consider whether issue is important to public before entering
confidentiality orders) and In re Alexander Grant & Co. Litig., 820 F.2d. 352, 357 (11 th
Cir. 1987) (Clark, J., dissenting) (stating interests of public are part of balancing process
when granting protective orders) with The Courier-Journal v. Marshall, 828 F.2d 361, 367
(6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting importance of issue to public as supporting press access to
discovery).
2 See Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 787 (1st Cir. 1988)
(noting strong public interest in discovery concerning important public health issue);
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 785 F.2d 1108, 1111-12 (3d Cir. 1986) (reviewing an
umella order issued in a tobacco products liability suit), cert. denied,484 U.S. 976, 108
S. Ct. 487 (1987); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1986) (discussing
media's right of access to proceedings involving environmental pollution); New York v.
United States Metals Ref. Co., 771 F.2d 796, 802 (3d Cir. 1985) (rejecting party's right to
publish report on air pollution from discovery materials); Sanders v. Shell Oil Co., 678 F.2d
614, 618-19 (5th Cir. 1982) (upholding protective order furnished in civil rights claim).
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821 F.2d. 139, 148 (2d Cir. 1987).
"Id.
's

(1984).

Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 22-29, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2202-05
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court in ajudicial proceeding.6 First Amendment advocates point out that such
a restriction constitutes a prior restraint outside the "good cause" review of
protective orders.67 This distinction is important for several reasons. First, there
is a well established principle that "prior restraints upon speech and publication
are the most serious and least tolerable infringement on First Amendment
rights."'s Relying on the belief that the preferred remedy for publication of
injurious information lies in subsequent criminal or civil action, as opposed to
court imposed restraints, such gag orders are held to the strictest scrutiny.69
Furthermore, a prior restraint issued upon an absent party carries with it an
even higher presumption of invalidity, making the threshold of constitutionality
virtually insurmountable.7" The Supreme Court has previously set aside an ex
parte, temporary restraining order on the ground that it was issued without
showing that reasonable efforts were made to contact the absent third party. 1
In In re ProvidenceJournal Co.72 the First Circuit went firther ruling that
where an order is on its face unconstitutional a party has the right to publish in
violation of the order.73

See In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1331 (D.C.
Cir. 1985) (separating Seattle Times holding from discussion on right of access to civil
proceeding); Tavoulareas v. Washington Post Co., 724 F.2d 1010, 1017 n.13 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (emphasizing First Amendment rights of disclosure separate from those concerning
access to discovery).
67 See sources cited supra note 2.

Nebraska Press Ass'n. v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559, 96 S. Ct. 2791, 2803 (1976).
69 See In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1348 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating
"[a]ny prior restraint on expression comes to this Court with a heavy presumption against
its constitutional validity" (quoting Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419,
91 S.Ct. 1575 (1971))), modified on reh 'g, 820 F.2d 1354 (1987), cert. granted and
dismissed on othergrounds,485 U.S. 693, 108 S. Ct. 1502 (1988).
',See Carrol v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183, 89 S.
Ct. 347, 353 (1968) (warning no participation in formulation of prior restraint orders
negates First Amendment safeguards); In re ProvidenceJournalCo., 820 F.2d at 1351
(emphasizing that First Amendment demands a full hearing on orders constituting a prior
restraint).
" See Carrol, 393 U.S. at 181, 89 S.Ct. at 352 (overturning issuance of restraining
order since petitioner received no notice).
72 820 F.2d 1342 (1st Cir. 1986), modified on reh'g, 820 F.2d 1354 (1987), cert.
grantedand dismissedon other grounds, 485 U.S. 693, 108 S.Ct. 1502 (1988).
73 See id.at 1347 (stating that "transparently invalid" court orders are not subject to
collateral bar rule).
U
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IV. THE ISSUES

N PROCTER & GAMBLE

The decision by the Sixth Circuit in Procter& Gamble is notable both for
its stinging criticism of the trial court's analysis and its firm stance on the issue
of protective orders. The District Court justifies the constitutionality of its
restraining order by placing heavy reliance on Seattle Times."' In contrast, the
Sixth Circuit unequivocally distances its holding from that of Seattle Times
characterizing its investigation as "the classic case of prior restraint."" The
court firmly rejected the inquisition into Business Week's journalistic methods
conducted by the trial judge characterizing such an inquiry as better suited to a
contempt proceeding as opposed to a third party injunction.76 The Sixth Circuit
completed this shift in analysis by identifying the factual distinction between the
two cases." In Seattle Times the plaintiff asserted a right to disseminate and in
Procter & Gamble a third party challenged the protective order.' Having
embraced a First Amendment inquiry the Sixth Circuit sought guidance within
a prior restraint analysis by reverting to the First Circuit's opinion in Providence
79
Journal.

Such a wholesale abandonment of the Supreme Court opinion, however, is
misplaced. Although Seattle Times did not purport to state that a third party
may never gain access to pre-trial proceedings, it did stress that dissemination
of such materials by party litigants falls outside traditional First Amendment
scrutiny. 0 The court based it's decision on the presumption that pre-trial
discovery is not open to the public. In Procter& Gamble the court appears to
rely on such a presumption." Despite a movement in modern legislation to the
contrary, there remains no right of access, in either common or constitutional
law, to all discovery produced by civil litigants.8 2 The decision in Procter&
Gamble, though not unequivocal, may be read in support of such a right.
After framing its analysis within prior restraint, the Sixth Circuit

4 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 192 (S.D. Ohio
1995).

s Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 225 (6th Cir. 1996).
7' Id. at 225; see also In re Rafferty, 864 F.2d 151, 155 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(emphasizing protective order cannot be used retroactively to restrict information gathered
outside discovery).
"Procter & Gamble Co., 78 F.3d at 225.
73 id.

Id. at 226.
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1984).
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1996).
u Seattle Times Co., 467 U.S. at 33, 104 S. Ct. at 2208.
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emphasized that commercial confidences will not justify such a restraining order
as that imposed upon Business Week." In doing so, however, the court ignores
the finding by the trial judge that Business Week was aware that the documents
were under seal of a court order when it decided to publish."4 It does so by
relying on the language ofProvidenceJournal,which held that a party may have
a right todefy a "transparently invalid prior restraint on pure speech. *s Such
an exception to the general rule, that a party may not violate an order and raise
the issue of its unconstitutionality collaterally as a defense in a criminal
contempt proceeding, is fraught with problems. The dangers of encouraging
parties to ignore court orders is obvious and this concern is prevalent throughout
the lower court's decision."
The majority opinion ends by identifying the underlying deficiencies in the
original protective order."' It suggests that a mere deferral to the original
protective order without a more exacting analysis of its underlying validity is
misplaced, particularly where it jeopardizes the right to an open judicial
system.' The court admonished the District Court for allowing the litigants to
unilaterally decide what is confidential and therefore protected by the order.8 9
By issuing such an order, the Sixth Circuit points out, the district court abdicated
its responsibility as an impartial arbitrator protecting the interests of the public.9

8 Procter& Gamble Co., 78 F.3d at 225.
Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 188 (S.D. Ohio
1995). District Court Judge Feikins concludes his criticism by stating, "Business Week
actively sought to obtain documents while it knew of the protective order." Id. at 191. In
contrast the Sixth Circuit describes Business Week's methods as "standard journalistic
protocol." Procter & Gamble Co., 98 F.3d at 224.
' In re Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d 1342, 1352-53 (1st Cir. 1986), modified
on reh 'g,820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. granted anddismissed on othergrounds,
485 U.S. 693, 108 S. Ct. 1502 (1988).
8 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 900 F. Supp. 186, 192-93 (S.D. Ohio
1995).
8 Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Trust Co., 78 F.3d 219, 227 (6th Cir. 1986).
" Id.; see also Carrol v. President and Comm'rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175,
183, 89 S.Ct. 347, 353 (1968) (emphasizing the First Amendment requires a narrower
court order); Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 775 (3rd Cir. 1994)
(criticizing the use of confidentiality orders without due consideration to the interest of the
public in obtaining protected information); In Re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 821
F.2d. 139, 148 (2nd Cir. 1987) (stressing a lack of good cause will warrant a lifting or
modification of a protective order); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 8-13 (1st Cir.
1986) (considering the media's First Amendment rights of access to discovery materials).
Procter& Gamble Co., 78 F.3d at 227.
"Id.
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The court then advocates for a more stringent balancing test before courts
furnish parties with a blanket protective order.91
While it is true that the decision in Procter& Gamble may have swung the
pendulum against poorly designed protective orders, the benefits provided by
Rule 26(c) cannot easily be ignored. Discovery is not a public forum for
information gathering, and therefore the right to restrict the dissemination of
those materials produced under the liberal parameters of the Federal Rules must
be maintained.' As opponents of such freedoms as that sort by Business Week
stress, the rights of privacy among litigants are not surrendered at the courthouse
9
door. 3
Protective orders do serve a useful purpose in protecting commercial
entities from abuses of the discovery process. As commentators have pointed
out, pre-trial protective discovery orders prevent parties from engaging in
unnecessary "fishing expeditions" and thus frustrate attempts to promote future
litigation or provide leverage in seeking favorable settlements.' A strengthening
of a third party's right to pierce such an order may therefore discourage open and
efficient discovery between litigants. By framing such a right under a prior
restraint analysis the Sixth Circuit may have undermined the goals set forth in

9" Pansy v. Borough of Stroudsburg, 23 F.3d 772, 787 (3rd Cir. 1994) (weighing
interests of parties in maintaining confidentiality order over settlement agreement). The
Pansy court considered the rights of a newspaper who intervened in a civil action to gain
access to a settlement agreement reached by the original litigants. Id. at 787-90. The
opinion draws upon several factors in balancing the validity of the confidentiality order
including whether the information is sought for a legitimate purpose, whether the parties
or issues in dispute of a public or private nature, the presence of the order in facilitating a

settlement and where, modification of an order is sought, the parties' reliance on the original
order. Id.; see also Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Technologies, Inc., 998 F.2d 157,
166-67 (3rd Cir. 1993); Public Citizen v. Liggett Group, Inc., 858 F.2d 775, 790 (1st Cir.
1988) (stressing broad protective orders are too over inclusive without modification for
individual documents); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1986) (requiring
a "particular factual demonstration of potential harm" as opposed to "conclusory
statements"); In re Continental Illinois Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1311 (7th Cir. 1984)
(rejecting implication that protective order, if properly entered, would foreclose any
subsequent unsealing of documents); In re San Juan Star Co., 662 F.2d 108, 117 (1st Cir.
1981) (advising courts to conduct more explicit investigation when prohibiting disclosure
of depositions).
'2 See Poliquin v. Garden Way, Inc., 989 F.2d 527, 532 (1st Cir. 1993) (stressing that
Federal Rules reflect broad judicial discretion in fashioning protective orders); see generally
MILLER,
"

supra note 42, at 510-02 (defending the attack on protective orders).
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 34-36, 104 S. Ct. 2199, 2208-09

(1984).
4 Id.; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION § 21.432 (3rd ed. 1995) (listing
various considerations in request for release of information under seal of protective order).
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Rule 26(c) and weakened the shield of protective orders created under Seattle
Times.
V. CONCLUSION

The popularity of protective orders can be seen as an abuse of the liberal
rules of discovery to the detriment of the First Amendment protections, or a
useful tool which encourages expedient and faithful discovery. To protect
constitutional freedoms, it appears necessary that the courts limit the growth of
protective orders. Alternatively, a blind leap to the defense of the First
Amendment without a careful inspection of the competing interests, at best
ignores the prerequisite to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and, at worst,
encourages the deliberate violation of court orders. A strengthening of the
Seattle Times holding is required to check the unbridled censorship of all
materials produced in discovery. Seattle Times ruled that protective orders are
not violative of the First Amendment. It did not however, as many courts have
interpreted, sanction the broad use of protective orders within the liberal
parameters of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A more thorough
investigation of the interests of the parties in dispute, as well as the collateral
effects on third parties brought within the scope of protective orders, must be
accomplished if courts wish to encourage efficient litigation within accepted
constitutional boundaries.
James C. Bradbury

